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Abstract—In this paper, we propose the Stateless Permutation
of Application Memory (SPAM), a software defense that enables
fine-grained data permutation for C programs. The key benefits
include resilience against attacks that directly exploit software
errors (i.e., spatial and temporal memory safety violations) in
addition to attacks that exploit hardware vulnerabilities such as
ColdBoot, RowHammer or hardware side-channels to disclose
or corrupt memory using a single cohesive technique. Unlike
prior work, SPAM is stateless by design making it automatically
applicable to multi-threaded applications.
We implement SPAM as an LLVM compiler pass with an
extension to the compiler-rt runtime. We evaluate it on the
C subset of the SPEC2017 benchmark suite and three real-
world applications: the Nginx web server, the Duktape Javascript
interpreter, and the WolfSSL cryptographic library. We further
show SPAM’s scalability by running a multi-threaded benchmark
suite. SPAM has greater security coverage and comparable
performance overheads to state-of-the-art software techniques
for memory safety on contemporary x86_64 processors. Our
security evaluation confirms SPAM’s effectiveness in preventing
intra/inter spatial/temporal memory violations by making the
attacker success chances as low as 116! .
I. INTRODUCTION
As reported by the Project Zero team at Google, memory
corruption issues are the root-cause of 68% of listed CVEs for
zero-day vulnerabilities within the last five years [91]. While
current solutions can be used to detect spatial and temporal
software memory safety violations during testing [65], [20],
[21] and/or post-deployment [51], [52], [18], [57], [54], [38],
the recent development of hardware vulnerabilities that can
leak secrets (e.g., hardware side-channels [30], [31], [79],
ColdBoot [32]) or corrupt memory (e.g., RowHammer [42])
need different specialized approaches. The use of multi-
ple security countermeasures complicates the deployment of
hardened software especially when operational resources and
budgets for security are limited. As pointed out by Saltzer
and Schroeder [62], an economy of mechanism is valuable
to handle multiple software and hardware memory security
issues.
In this paper, we present the Stateless Permutation of
Application Memory (SPAM), a post-deployment defense that
provides cohesive protection against software and hardware
memory corruptions with no explicit metadata. To better
understand how SPAM works, let us consider the lifetime of
an object from allocation to deallocation as shown in Figure 1.
SPAM permutes the layout of data in program memory
based on its location in the virtual address space. When a new
region of memory is allocated by the program, SPAM specifies
∗Both authors contributed equally to this work.
a permutation for the data of this allocation. Thus, the mapping
between memory instances (e.g., C structs) and their actual lay-
out in memory is unknown to an attacker. The allocation base
address and size are used to derive one specific permutation out
of
( S
G
)
! different permutations, where S is the allocation size
and G is the permutation granularity in number of bytes. SPAM
also uses a unique per-process key and a disclosure-resistant
pseudo-random number generator to mitigate record-and-reply
attacks. As illustrated in Figure 1 (¶), with SPAM even if
attackers have access to a memory safety vulnerability that
leads to an arbitrary read/write capability, they can no longer
infer the order or offsets of the victim data within the allocated
region.
If the allocated object is multi-dimensional (i.e., a com-
pound data structure with one or more buffer fields), SPAM
converts them to one-dimension using a novel source-to-source
transformation, Buf2Ptr, that promotes struct buffer fields into
their own allocations. An example transformation for a struct is
shown in Figure 1 (·). Here, the buffer field c is promoted to a
pointer c_ptr that points to a standalone allocation containing
the original buffer field data. Both allocations, A1 and c_ptr,
are permuted independently using their corresponding base
addresses and sizes. In other words, Buf2Ptr reduces the intra-
object memory safety problem to be equivalent to an inter-
object one.
When an object is freed the same memory region may be
allocated for a new object posing a security concern. To mit-
igate this, SPAM generates a random value that is embedded
within each pointer returned by the memory allocator. Thus, a
single memory region can have multiple different permutations
dependent on the random value. For example, in Figure 1 (¸)
when A1 is freed, the memory allocator will use the same
memory again to satisfy the next allocation (i.e., A3). SPAM
embeds a different random value in A3 resulting in a new
permutation. As a result, even if the same memory is allocated
to a different object during the program lifetime, the attacker
has no guarantee that the data would be at the same locations
as the freed object. Thus, SPAM provides complete coverage
against software memory corruptions.
Additionally, SPAM provides resilience against hardware
memory corruptions by keeping the data permuted across the
memory hierarchy (i.e., caches and DRAM). For example,
sensitive data leaked by a ColdBoot attack is indistinguish-
able from random as it would be permuted. Similarly, the
randomness of physical memory increases the complexity of
a RowHammer attack as the attacker needs to know the
exact layout of adjacent data to decide where to trigger a bit
flip. Moreover, SPAM provides a natural protection against
speculative side-channels as speculatively executed loads will
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typedef	struct	{
		char	a;							
		double	b;					
		char	c[3];				
		void	(*fp)();	
}	A_t;
Struct Definition
SPAM
A1
A2
free
A3
Object Allocation Multi-dimensional Objects
Virtual Address (VA)
1 2
A1
Time
Object Deallocation and Reuse3
typedef	struct	{
		char	a;							
		double	b;					
		A_t_c	*c_ptr;	
		void	(*fp)();	
}	A_t;
typedef	struct	{
		char	c[3];				
}	A_t_c;
A_t	*A1	=	malloc(
		sizeof(A_t));
A_t	*A2	=	malloc(
		sizeof(A_t));
free(A1);										
A_t	*A3	=	malloc(
		sizeof(A_t));
main.c
Fig. 1: A sample program highlighting the lifecycle of an object in SPAM: ¶ every object has a unique permutation, · buffer
to pointer promotion (Buf2Ptr) for multi-dimensional objects and ¸ deallocation of objects.
always return permuted data making it harder for an attacker
to recover the original memory layout. More importantly,
combinations of techniques that aim to provide similar levels
of protection as SPAM may not build on top of each other
or may incur higher performance costs. As we argue in this
work, there is no single cohesive solution that can address both
software and hardware memory violations.
One important aspect of SPAM is that it does not store
any metadata separately in protected memory regions [41], [1]
or as part of the object itself [3], [21]. SPAM dynamically
calculates permutations for every load and store. Thus, it
neither introduces additional storage overheads nor provides
the opportunity to be manipulated by an attacker. Especially
in the context of multi-threaded programs the lack of metadata
in SPAM allows scalable performance of application code.
In contrast, memory safety techniques that rely on explicit
metadata often have to use locks to maintain correct and secure
behavior which negatively impacts scalability.
SPAM is implemented within the LLVM compiler frame-
work and currently targets the x86_64 architecture. The
experimental results show that SPAM has comparable perfor-
mance overheads to state-of-the-art software techniques for
memory safety on the C subset of SPEC2017 benchmark
suite [8], a web server [73], a Javascript interpreter [76],
and a cryptographic library [85]. We further show SPAM’s
scalability by running a multi-threaded benchmark suite [2].
Additionally, we conduct a quantitative security analysis to
demonstrate SPAM effectiveness in preventing intra/inter spa-
tial/temporal memory safety corruptions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
specify the threat model and assumptions are illustrated in
Section II. We introduce SPAM in Section III and discuss
our prototype implementation in Section IV. We then analyze
the security of SPAM in Section V. Section VI highlights the
main performance optimizations, while Section VII extensively
evaluates SPAM and compares it against state-of-the-art tech-
niques. We summarize SPAM deployment considerations in
Section VIII and discuss the current prototype limitations in
Section IX. Section X summarizes the related work. Finally,
we conclude in Section XI.
II. THREAT MODEL & ASSUMPTIONS
Adversarial Capabilities. We consider a powerful, yet real-
istic adversary model that is consistent with previous work on
software memory safety [51], [52], [20], [21], [65], [54] with
stronger assumptions against side-channel capable adversaries.
We assume that the adversary is aware of the applied defenses
and has access to the source code or binary image of the
target program. Furthermore, the target program suffers from
a memory vulnerability that allows the adversary to read from,
and write to, arbitrary memory addresses. We further assume
that the attacker can disclose information at run time [69]
and use side-channels [44] as part of the attack to read or
manipulate memory contents.
Assumptions. SPAM requires the availability of source code
for the target program. This requirement is true for the majority
of state-of-the-art techniques (see Table V). We also assume
that the underlying operating system (OS) enables WˆX—i.e.,
no code injection is allowed (non-executable data), and all code
sections are non-writable (immutable code). SPAM protection
applies to all instrumented code and libraries. Uninstrumented
codes, such as third party libraries and the operating system
runtime, can be fully utilized without limitations, but are
not protected by SPAM. This model offers a path to incre-
mental adoption of SPAM. Additionally, the SPAM runtime
is considered part of the trusted-computing base (TCB). A
number of low-overhead intra-process isolation mechanisms
can be utilized to harden the runtime [77], [33]. We leave the
exploration of runtime hardening for future work.
III. STATELESS PERMUTATION OF APPLICATION
MEMORY (SPAM)
Our proposal to guarantee complete memory safety is to
ensure that the data layout is always permuted at a very
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fine granularity. This permutation is meant to ensure that an
attacker cannot leak useful information or overwrite critical
data within the program even in the presence of memory
safety vulnerabilities. To address our powerful threat model,
we require that information about permuted objects is neither
stored as part of the object itself, nor encoded in the binary
version that can be accessed by an attacker.
A. Spatial Memory Safety
When a new memory region of size S is allocated by the
program, typically by calling malloc, SPAM uses the base
address (BA), size (S), and a 64-bit per-process key (K) to
compute its permutation.1 As shown in Figure 1 (¶), the struct
A_t is permuted differently for each allocation instance (i.e.,
A1 and A2). This new permutation defines the new offsets
for the individual data bytes within the struct. This runtime
per-instance layout makes it harder for attackers to construct a
reliable exploit as they need to guess the correct permutation.
Generating a permutation. SPAM is a format-preserving
encryption (FPE) scheme [29], [59] which uses the Fisher-
Yates shuffle [26] algorithm (modernized in [24] and popularly
known as the Knuth shuffle [43]) to produce an unbiased
permutation (i.e., every permutation is equally likely). To gen-
erate SPAM permutations we follow the approach described
in Algorithm 1: (1) a PRNG is seeded with a per-process key,
the base address of an allocation, and the allocation size (2) the
Fisher-Yates shuffle algorithm is then executed to completion
resulting in the set of permutations that are used to access
memory. Algorithm 2 details the Fisher-Yates shuffle algorithm
which permutes an initialized array of elements in-place and
returns the array. The permutation generated by SPAM can be
viewed as a block cipher, where cryptographically speaking,
the strength of the scheme depends on the PRNG. PRNGs
only provide numbers in a fixed range. For Fisher-Yates, we
bound the PRNG’s output using a modulo operation according
to the number of elements to be shuffled. While Fisher-Yates is
unbiased, the modulo operation may introduces bias affecting
uniformity. We evaluate the uniformity of the permutations
generated by our implementation in Section VII-E.
Algorithm 1 Generating SPAM Permutation
Requires: G—Permutation Granularity, B—Permutation Boundary
Inputs: K—Per-Process Key, BA—Base Address, S—Allocation Size
Outputs: P—Permutation
1: function GENPERM(K, BA, S)
2: R← PRNGSEED(K, BA, S) . Initialize PRNG
3: C← B/G . Define permutation chunks
4: P← FISHER-YATES(R, C) . Get permutation
5: return P
6: end function
Updating pointers. A new pointer to access the appropriate
memory location is computed given a pointer and the provided
permutation. This process is shown in more detail in Fig-
ure 2. SPAM only changes the block offset bits that define the
permuted location of a data chunk. The choice of permutation
boundary, B, is arbitrary, but defines the minimum allocation
size. For example as shown in Figure 3, an object of size S
1Without loss of generality, we focus the discussion here about heap objects
(C structs) allocated by a memory allocator. In Section IV, we discuss how
we support stack & globals.
Algorithm 2 Fisher-Yates Shuffle
Inputs: R—Random Number Generator, C—Permutation Chunks
Outputs: P—Permutation
1: function FISHER-YATES(R,C)
2: P← INIT(C) . Initialize array of C elements
3: for i from C−1 to 1 do
4: j← R( ) %i . Generate number s.t. 0≤ j ≤ i
5: SWAP(P[i],P[j])
6: end for
7: return P . The permuted indexes.
8: end function
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Fig. 2: The process of updating pointers in SPAM.
bytes will consist of SB permutation blocks, where each block
consists of BG chunks. Each block is then permuted given a
per-process key, the object base address and size. For objects
greater in size than the permutation boundary, we divide them
into permutation blocks and permute them separately.
(Un-)permuting memory. External library calls (e.g., the ones
made to libc) are quite common. To maintain compatibility
with the uninstrumented external code, SPAM provides UN-
PERMUTE and PERMUTE primitives. The UNPERMUTE and
PERMUTE primitives are emitted for pointer arguments before
and after external calls, respectively.
B. Sub-object Memory Safety
To provide intra-object memory safety, SPAM proposes
a novel application of an idea called, Buf2Ptr, that has
been previously used in the area of data layout optimiza-
tions for enhancing performance [37], [61], [89]. Buf2Ptr
promotes array, or buffer, fields defined in C/C++ struc-
tures to be independent reducing the problem of intra-object
S    Object Size (1024B)
Blocks
Chunks
G   Granularity (8B)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
B    Permutation Boundary (128B)
16! Permutations
Fig. 3: An example of how permutations are computed for
an object of size, S = 1024 bytes. We use a permutation
boundry, B = 128 bytes with a G = 8 bytes permutation
granularity, resulting in BG = 16! possible permutations.
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Alias Address (AA) (64-bit)
Virtual Address (48-bit)Alias Number
(16-bit)
Fig. 4: The construction of alias addresses created by SPAM
to provide probabilistic temporal memory safety.
allocation to be equivalent to inter-object allocation. This
allows SPAM to rely on the same security guarantees dis-
cussed in Section III-A. Buf2Ptr eliminates all security con-
cerns about structs contiguously laid out in memory (e.g.,
malloc(10*sizeof(struct Foo))) as they would no
longer contain arrays to overflow. To illustrate a Buf2Ptr
transformation, consider the example in Listing 2. Array fields
within a structure are replaced with a promoted pointer (e.g.,
p_buf) and a new structure containing the original array is
defined (e.g., Foo_buf). As a result of this transformation,
allocations, deallocations, and usages of the original field must
also be properly promoted. For example, an allocation for a
composite data type (e.g., Foo) becomes separate allocations
based on the number of fields promoted (e.g., Foo_buf).
1
2 struct Foo {
3 char buf[10];
4 };
5
6
7
8
9 struct Foo *f = malloc(
10 sizeof(struct Foo));
11
12
13
14 f->buf[7] = 'A';
15
16 free(f);
17
(a) Original
// Promoted Type
struct Foo_buf {
char buf[10];
};
struct Foo {
struct Foo_buf *p_buf;
};
// Promoted Allocations
struct Foo *f = malloc(
sizeof(struct Foo));
f->p_buf = malloc(
sizeof(struct Foo_buf));
// Promoted Usages
f->p_buf->buf[7] = 'A';
// Promoted Deallocations
free(f->p_buf);
free(f);
(b) Transformed
Listing 2: An example of Buf2Ptr transformation.
C. Temporal Memory Safety
Permuting the object layout alone as described in Sec-
tion III-A is not sufficient to prevent temporal attacks such
as use-after-free. This is primarily due to the fact that the
attacker’s object and the victim one share the same base
address (i.e., due to the deterministic allocator behavior) and
key (i.e., as both objects correspond to the same process). We
observe that the problem is due to address reuse among allo-
cations. We avoid this problem by re-purposing the currently
unused high order bits of the virtual address (VA). As shown
in Figure 4, SPAM randomly chooses a R-bit alias number
(AN) and encodes it within the most significant R-bits of
the base address. As SPAM generates permutations based on
the entire address, named alias address (AA), we get a new
permutation for the same memory region (even if the lower
order bits of the VA remains the same).
SPAM
C
Code IR
C
Code
Inst. 
Pass
Src-to-src
Trans.
Object
Files
Runtime 
Library
Hardened
Binary
LLVM LinkerClang
Fig. 5: The SPAM compiler infrastructure framework.
Figure 1 (¸) shows how SPAM generates a new permu-
tation for the same object after freeing the old one. Each
allocation can have up to 2R different aliases (where R depends
on the hardware architecture), with each alias having its own
permutation. SPAM drops the AN bits whenever the alias
address is passed to the free function so that the processor
functionality for address handling remains unaffected by our
security modification. Algorithms 3 to 5 summarize the steps
needed for SPAM to provide its spatial and temporal memory
safety guarantees.
Algorithm 3 Allocation Creation
Requires: M—Memory Allocator, RNG—Random Number Generator
Inputs: S—Allocation Size
Outputs: AA—Alias Address
1: function ALLOC(S)
2: VA← M(S) . Returns Virtual Address
3: AN← RNG( ) . Generate 16-bit random number
4: AA←{AN,VA[47 : 0]} . Assemble Alias Address
5: return AA
6: end function
Algorithm 4 Allocation Access
Requires: K—Per-Process Key, G—Permutation Granularity
Inputs: AA—Alias Address
Outputs: VAnew–Virtual Address
1: function ACCESS(AA)
2: BA← GETBASEPTR(AA) . Get allocation base address
3: S← GETSIZE(BA) . Get allocation size
4: P← GENPERM(K,BA,S) . Get permutation
5: VA← STRIP(AA) . Strip Alias Number
6: VAnew← GETPERMPTR(VA,P) . Get new address
7: return VAnew
8: end function
Algorithm 5 Allocation Delete
Requires: M—Memory Allocator
Inputs: AA—Alias Address
1: function DELETE(AA)
2: BA← GETBASEPTR(AA) . Get allocation base address
3: VA← STRIP(BA) . Strip Alias Number
4: FREE(M, VA) . M frees memory normally
5: end function
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
Figure 5 provides an overview of our SPAM framework.
In this section, we discuss the different components.
Source-to-Source Transformation. We implement Buf2Ptr as
a source-to-source transformation pass using Clang’s rewriter
interface. The pass performs two main traversals over the AST.
The first traversal analyzes each translation unit to collect a
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whole program view of composite data types (e.g., structs)
and their usages. This information is used to determine what
can be legally promoted, as explained in Section III-B. The
second traversal performs the actual rewriting.
Instrumentation Pass. To handle heap memory, we imple-
ment an instrumentation pass at the LLVM IR level aug-
menting all the necessary loads and stores to invoke the
runtime which computes accesses to the appropriate permuted
memory locations. We iterate over all loads and stores and
emit a call to the runtime to resolve the permuted memory
location to be accessed. Then, we determine whether calls
refer to externally linked functions or functions defined in other
translation units. Finally, external calls are broken down into
two categories wrapped and unwrapped. Wrapped calls are
simply replaced with SPAM specific variants that operate on
permuted memory to improve performance. Unwrapped calls
are guarded by a pair of UNPERMUTE and PERMUTE runtime
functions if pointer arguments are used in the relevant call.
These operations ensure compatibility with uninstrumented
code by unpermuting/permuting data before/after executing
uninstrumented code. Table VII (in Appendix B) includes a
list of SPAM wrappers.
Our current prototype support for global and stack memory
builds on top of LowFat [22], [23]. In addition to the features
provided by LowFat, for constant globals (i.e., those typically
in the .data) we emit a call to a REGISTERGLOBAL runtime
function. The REGISTERGLOBAL function is appended to
the global constructors (i.e., .ctor) to permute each global
variable on program load. Similarly, for stack variables usually
passed by the OS (e.g., argv), we emit a call to the REGIS-
TERSTACK runtime function in order to permute memory on
program start (i.e., main).
Runtime. SPAM’s runtime, implemented as an extension to
LLVM’s compiler-rt, encompasses the following func-
tionality: (1) getting an allocation’s base address (2) look-
ing up the allocation’s size (3) generating a permutation
(4) calculating the memory location to be accessed and (5)
unpermuting and permuting memory for compatibility with
uninstrumented code. Our current implementation builds on
top of the LowFat [20] allocator. Support for other allocators
is possible as long as they provide (1) and (2) making our
approach allocator agnostic. Appendix D provides an overview
of the runtime API.
Permutation Parameters. In our current prototype we use
a permutation granularity of 8B (i.e., every successive 8B in
memory will remain unpermuted while an entire 8B chunk can
be stored in any place within a permutation boundary). The
main reason for this choice is that 8B accesses are common
on 64-bit systems. Using a smaller chunk size, while supported
by our implementation, will add additional overheads. We use
a permutation boundary of 128B to match the cache line size of
Last Level Cache 2. Our current prototype targets the x86_64
architecture, which can have a maximum alias number of 16-
bits as the virtual address consumes 48-bits of the total 64-bit
address space.
2Permutation boundary can be easily tuned to match the requirements of
different processors (e.g., 64B LLC cachelines on recent AMD processors).
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we first discuss the security guarantees
provided by SPAM then we evaluate them quantitatively.
TABLE I: The basic primitives that define a program and
how SPAM affects them.
Uninstrumented SPAM
Memory
addr ← malloc(S) baddr ← SPAM_malloc(S)
perm ← genperm(K, baddr, S)
paddr ← getaddr(addr, perm)
free(addr) SPAM_free(paddr)
val ← load(addr) val ← load(paddr)
store(addr, val) store(paddr, val)
Compute val ← arith(val) val ← arith(val)
Control-Flow branch(addr) branch(addr)
Table I shows the primitives that define a program. SPAM’s
mechanism for protecting memory involves introducing new
secure primitives that act as a shell to guard memory operations
as introduced in Section III. The permutation shell around the
memory operations guarantees that input and output operations
that attackers can use to subvert/control programs have un-
controllable behavior. Memory operations can be used in two
modes: relative or absolute. With absolute read/write capabil-
ity, an attacker can control the addr supplied to a load or
store. A relative read/write capability returns/updates a value
at an arbitrary offset from a known address (e.g., f->buf[7]
where 7 is an example of an attacker controlled offset). An
overflow in the buffer field, buf, can corrupt other fields in
object, f.
SPAM revokes absolute capabilities as now every load/store
instruction depends on a secret permutation (perm) that is not
available to the attacker. This permutation is derived using a
secure key (K) and is computed at runtime (using genperm
and getaddr) for every access. Alternatively, an attacker
can read/write memory via an external mechanism (e.g., side-
channels) to bypass the secure primitives. SPAM nullifies this
external capability by keeping data permuted across the entire
memory hierarchy. This makes it impractical for an attacker
to recover the memory contents. In addition to that, SPAM
revokes relative capabilities using Buf2Ptr which reduces them
into absolute read/write capabilities.
Common exploits build upon the absolute/relative read-
/write capabilities as discussed above. We briefly describe how
these exploits are each specifically handled by SPAM.
A. Resilience to Common Exploits
Buffer under-/over-flows. SPAM can defend against the ex-
ploitation of buffer overflows (and underflows) by hiding the
mapping between program objects and their actual layout in
memory. Even if the attacker has access to the source code
and/or binary image of the victim program, they cannot infer
the layout of the victim object. The same object can have
multiple layouts based on its location in memory. With high
probability, with SPAM in place, the attacker cannot corrupt
or leak information that can be used to mount many exploit
variants. SPAM’s protection applies to both inter- and intra-
object safety (as Buf2Ptr reduces the intra-object problem to
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inter-object).
Use-after-frees. As described in Section III-C, SPAM provides
temporal memory safety via the alias address space. The same
allocated virtual/physical memory region can have up to 216
different aliases (each alias having its own permutation). This
alias address space is sufficient to thwart use-after-free attacks
where the object type before the free aligns with the confused
type after the free having a big impact on the reliability
of these exploits [90]. Heap Feng Shui attacks exploit a
memory allocator’s determinism to arrange memory so that it is
favorable for an attacker to manipulate a victim allocation [70].
Similarly, SPAM relies on the alias address space to generate
multiple permutations for the same memory region, making
it impractical to infer any information about an object layout
based on another object, even if both have the same type.
Uninitialized Reads. While SPAM does not explicitly zero out
memory that may have held security sensitive data, the fact that
the memory is left permuted after a free is sufficient in many
cases. The next program to use the same memory region will
be assigned a different permutation key by default, making it
impractical to recover the data by mistake. Additionally, an
attacker trying to access this sensitive data would need the
appropriate permutation in order to unscramble the memory.
The same applies for peeking the memory with variadic
function misuse attacks [25].
Control-Flow Hijacking and Data-Oriented Attacks. Given
a memory error, attackers can gain arbitrary memory read/write
primitives. Attackers can then leverage such primitives to
launch different attacks, such as control-flow hijacking [7],
[69], [64], [78], information leakage [72], or data-only at-
tacks [13], [36], [56], [14]. SPAM effectively mitigates all of
those attacks as it makes it harder for the attacker to utilize the
memory read/write primitives. For instance, it is impractical to
hijack the control-flow of the program (e.g., by overwriting a
function pointer in a C struct) if the whole struct is permuted
with
( S
G
)
! different permutations. The same argument holds
even for the more critical data-only attacks that corrupt the
program without changing its control-flow. SPAM provides
sufficient probabilistic guarantees for protecting the security-
critical data structures of a program.
Memory errors in uninstrumented code. SPAM unper-
mutes the data that is passed to uninstrumented code (e.g.,
library functions) while the rest of the program data remains
permuted. So, if the uninstrumented code has a memory
vulnerability it may only reliably corrupt the portion of data
that is passed to it. Unlike other techniques that provide no
security guarantees for uninstrumented code, SPAM reduces
the attack surface by maintaining the rest of the program data
permuted.
1 if (i < sizeof(a)) { // mispredicted branch
2 secret = a[i];
3 val = b[64 * secret]; // secret is leaked
4 }
Listing 3: Example speculative execution attack.
Speculative Execution Attacks. With SPAM, utilizing spec-
ulative exploits is more challenging for an attacker. Not
TABLE II: RIPE Results
ASAN MPX SPAM
Working Attacks 2/20 0/20 0/20
only is the data permuted, but the speculative (instrumented)
load additionally uses a different permutation to access the
permuted data. Consider an attacker that tries to speculatively
load the secret value a[i] using an out-of-bound index, i,
as shown in Listing 3. In this case, they will end up with
an unpredictable value in secret due to SPAM’s security
primitives which permute the address of a[i].
Hardware Memory Violations. Let us consider an attacker
wants to leak a function pointer from a struct that has ten
other fields. Using a side-channel, the attacker leaks the entire
struct. However, due to SPAM’s permutation they would not
be able to recognize the needed function pointer (or even
reconstruct the struct layout)3. By the same principal, SPAM
provides indirect protection against other types of attacks such
as RowHammer and ColdBoot attacks.
Chosen Data Attacks. One natural question to ask is whether
an attacker can use data from a computation to recover the
data structure layout and therefore gain an insight into the
permutation. Let us assume that an attacker can inject N unique
values into N fields of a struct. Let us further assume that
the attacker can read/leak the permutation. This read will give
the attacker the permutation that is valid only for the address
allocated to the instance of the struct that has been primed
with unique known values. A different allocation (address)
will have a different permutation. To be able to predict the
permutation for any address, the attacker would have to do
AES-inverse(key, alias|address) based on sev-
eral reads of permuted locations. The complexity of this attack
is the complexity of reversing AES with chosen plaintexts.
Alternatively, an attacker may perform Heap Feng Shui [70]
style exploit and place a similar vulnerable data structure at a
location for which they know the permutation. To carry out this
attack, the attacker has to make at least 216 attempts because
the alias number is chosen randomly for each allocation at the
same address.
B. Security Litmus Tests
Here, we quantitatively evaluate the security guarantees
provided by SPAM and compare it against two state-of-the-
art techniques: AddressSanitizer (ASAN) and Intel MPX, as
representatives of pre- and post-deployment memory safety
solutions, respectively.
RIPE. We quantitatively evaluate security by using RIPE [83],
an open source intrusion prevention benchmark suite. We first
ported RIPE to 64-bit systems and compiled it with SPAM.
While RIPE can support attacks on stack, globals and the
heap, we focus solely on heap-related attacks for our current
prototype. For our baseline, the total number of attacks that
3One may argue that using permutation granularity, G = 8 bytes, might
help the attacker distinguish between pointer and non-pointer data items in
a leaked struct. This can be thwarted by configuring our framework to use
smaller values for G in such cases.
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TABLE III: Security Microbenchmarks
ASAN MPX4 SPAM
Intra-Overflow 7 3 3
Inter-Overflow 3 3 3
Use-after-free 3 7 3
Type Confusion 3 3 3
Buffer Over-read 3 3 3
Uninitialized Read 7 7 3
survive with a native (non-protected) GCC and Clang is 20
attacks. The results for all tools are summarized in Table II.
As expected, MPX4 and SPAM are able to prevent all attacks
due to providing intra-object protection. ASAN overlooks two
intra-object attacks in which a function pointer is corrupted.
Microbenchmarks. In addition to RIPE, we implement a
small set of security microbenchmarks. While RIPE tests for
control-flow hijacking attacks, our set of microbenchmarks
aims to provide wider coverage. Thus, it tests against equally
important categories of attacks, such as type-confusion and
information leakage. The complete set of results denoting the
ability for a given tool to detect specific vulnerabilities are
summarized in Table III. The results highlight the scope of
each tool. SPAM is the only solution of those evaluated that is
comprehensive enough to provide coverage over the spectrum
of these vulnerabilities.
Cohesiveness. We evaluate the security trade-offs between the
different tools. We use the security microbenchmarks and RIPE
(shown as Control-Flow) as indications of a tool’s security
coverage. The results are summarized in Figure 6 with the
overall area of the polygon indicating the number of categories
covered (i.e., the larger the area the greater the coverage). As
we argue in this work, no single tool can provide a cohesive
solution for memory violations as SPAM highlighting the
notability of its approach. In Section X, we discuss additional
hardware security related aspects of SPAM in comparison
to other state-of-the-art techniques further highlighting its
cohesiveness.
Uninit.
Read
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Overflow
Inter-
Overflow
Buffer-
Overread
Control-
Flow
Type
Confusion
Use-a�er-
free
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Fig. 6: Quantitative security trade-offs for different tools.
VI. SPAM PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATIONS
Permutation Deduplication. To avoid repeating the work of
generating permutations multiple times, at the beginning of a
4With BNDPRESERVE=1 & -fchkp-first-field-has-own-bounds
function we generate the permutations for any pointer that is
passed as a function input. We propagate a permutation across
multiple loads and stores (if they share the same base address)
instead of recomputing it. We pack this permutation into an
integer of an appropriate size depending on the permutation
granularity to efficiently pass it around. This integer is taken as
an argument to our runtime function (GETPERMPTR) to avoid
re-generating a permutation for each load/store. Similarly,
for pointers defined later in the function’s scope, a call to
our generate permutation function is emitted and the packed
integer holding the permutation is propagated.
Software Caching. Since all accesses to the same object have
the same base address, we exploit this locality by using a small
lookup cache before accessing the permutation function. We
implement a direct-mapped software cache in our runtime to
store the corresponding permutation for a given base address.5
If this optimization is enabled, an attacker may manipulate
the cache contents to undermine SPAM security. To handle
this issue, we propose two protection mechanisms. The first
solution is to store the cache itself in a permuted fashion
much like the rest of the application memory. In this case, the
load time address of the cache will act as the base address.
Alongside with the per-program key, a unique permutation is
generated for the cache contents. Then, all cache accesses
from the SPAM runtime are updated to use it directly with
no additional latency. Alternatively, if available, functionality
like Intel Memory Protection Keys (MPK) [55], [77] can be
used to protect the cache. MPK provides a single, unprivileged
instruction, wrpkru, that can change page access permissions
by re-purposing four unused bits in the page table. First, the
cache is placed in pages that have a particular protection key,
forming the sensitive domain. Then, all cache accesses from
the SPAM runtime are guarded with the wrpkru instruction so
that no other loads/stores have access to the cache contents. For
completeness, we evaluate MPK cache protection overheads
on an Amazon Web Services (AWS) c5.large instance and
find that it only incurs approximately a 2− 3% overhead on
average over having no protection.
Architecture-dependent Optimization. Inspired by Low-
Fat [20], we use the Bit Field Extract BEXTR instruction
to enhance performance. This x86_64 instruction extracts n
contiguous bits from a given source. BEXTR allows us to save
a few instructions when operating on permutations packed
into integers. Instead of shifting and applying a mask to
extract the necessary bits corresponding to a permutation (e.g.,
Block Offset bits in Figure 2), we replace this with a single
instruction.
VII. EVALUATION
We evaluate SPAM across multiple dimensions. First,
we compare the performance of SPAM against state-of-the-
art pre- and post-deployment memory safety solutions using
SPEC2017. Second, we demonstrate SPAM’s deployability by
compiling and running three real-world applications. Third, we
analyze Buf2Ptr’s completeness by reporting its coverage for
all benchmarks. Fourth, we evaluate SPAM’s suitability for
5Our current prototype uses a default cache size of 217 entries. Each entry
stores 64-bit address and 64-bit packed permutation, resulting in a total size
of 2MB.
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multi-threaded applications. Fifth, we measure the uniformity
and efficiency of SPAM permutations to support our security
claims.
Experimental Setup. We run our experiments on a bare-
metal Intel Skylake-based Xeon Gold 6126 processor run-
ning at 2.6GHz with RHEL Linux 7.5 (kernel 3.10). We
compare SPAM against AddressSanitizer (ASAN) and Intel
MPX, as representatives of pre- and post-deployment memory
safety solutions, respectively.6 Each tool is run using its best
recommended settings (See Table VI for a full list of compiler
flags and environment variables). We run each tool such that
it suppresses its warnings or errors so that benchmarks run to
completion. Additionally, we disable any reporting to minimize
the performance impact this functionality may have. For tools
that provide coverage other than the heap, we only enable
their respective heap support for a fair comparison with our
current SPAM prototype.7 Given the difference in compiler
versions and optimization levels that each tool supports, we
normalize each against their respective baselines for proper
comparison. To minimize variability, each benchmark is ex-
ecuted 5 times and the average of the execution times is
reported; error bars represent the maximum and minimum
values observed over the 5 runs.
A. Performance Comparisons
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Fig. 7: Performance overheads of the C subset of SPEC2017
for different tools normalized to their corresponding baseline
for heap memory protection.
We compare SPAM’s performance against ASAN and
Intel MPX by compiling and running a standard application
benchmark suite, namely the C programs in SPEC2017 [8],
using the three tools separately. Additional benchmarks (e.g.,
Olden [60] and PtrDist [4]) are evaluated in Appendix A.
While analyzing the results, it is important to keep in mind
the security coverage that each tool provides because they are
not all the same.
SPEC2017. We specifically look at the C subset of bench-
marks in SPEC CPU2017 [8]. Of the 9 C benchmarks, we
found that perlbench and gcc are heavily reliant on
undefined behavior, namely using out-of-bounds pointers in
computations, storing them in memory, and returning them
in-bounds again upon pointer dereferencing. The undefined
6We exclude SoftboundCETS as it fails to run many of the benchmarks due
to strictness and compatibility issues.
7While our current prototype supports stack memory, there are still minor
items that have yet to be completed to make it robust enough for all programs.
Thus, we leave the evaluation of stack memory permutation for future work.
behavior in perlbench and gcc makes them incompatible
with SPAM and MPX. For the purposes of evaluating SPAM’s
performance, we run the two troublesome programs with an
“in-order” permutation (i.e., all of the SPAM’s instrumentation
and runtime wrappers are used whereas the program data itself
is written to memory with no shuffling) to closely model
SPAM’s impact. We omit perlbench and gcc from the
computed averages in the figure. Benchmarks are run to com-
pletion using the test inputs and single threaded execution.
For benchmarks with multiple inputs, the sum of the execution
time of all inputs is used. The geometric mean of each tool
is as follows: ASAN (1.77x), MPX (1.97x), SPAM (2.11x)8,
and SPAM + Buf2Ptr (2.13x). The main reason for the high
overheads of certain SPEC2017 benchmarks, such as mcf
and x264 is the excessive use of memcpy. Although our
current prototype implements its own memcpy wrapper for
performance, it is not as efficient as the standard library one
with vectorization support. We leave the implementation of
more performant library wrappers for future work.
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Fig. 8: Nginx performance overheads with SPAM for heap
memory protection.
B. Real-world Case Studies
To demonstrate the capabilities of our current SPAM
prototype, we use it to compile and run three real-world
applications: the Nginx web server [73], the Duktape Javascript
interpreter [76], and the WolfSSL cryptographic library [85].
Nginx. We use Nginx [73] (version 1.11.11), as a representa-
tive I/O bound benchmark. To simulate typical workload con-
figurations, we have Nginx serve different sized files according
to the page weight (i.e., the amount of data served) of modern
websites according to the 2019 HTTP Archive Web Almanac
report [35]. To generate client load, we used the multi-threaded
Siege [27] benchmarking tool. We issued 500 requests with
50 concurrent connections for each page weight using the
loopback interface to avoid network congestion issues. We
record the throughput (TP), and transfer rates (TX). The results
in Figure 8 show that on average SPAM incurs a 1.3x overhead
relative to the baseline. As file sizes become larger, the I/O
starts to dominate and the performance impact of SPAM is as
low as 1.24x; in contrast, for smaller files SPAM’s performance
8Enabling global memory permutation for SPAM incurs an additional 11%
on top of the heap results bringing the geometric mean from 2.11x to 2.22x.
8
impact increases to 1.4x. Enabling global memory permutation
shows no measurable performance difference over the heap
results. This is primarily due to the fact that the initial cost of
permutation for globals (i.e., REGISTERGLOBAL) is amortized
as the server is already loaded before it receives requests.
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Fig. 9: Duktape performance overheads with SPAM for heap
memory protection.
Duktape. We evaluate the Duktape [76] (version 2.5.0)
Javascript interpreter with a default build configuration running
the Octane 2 benchmark suite [28]9. We record the benchmark
scores as reported by the Octane 2 suite and show the relative
performance of SPAM compared to the baseline. The results
in Figure 9 show an overhead with a geometric mean of
approximately 3.15x. Similar to Nginx, enabling global mem-
ory permutation shows no measurable performance overheads
for much the same reasons. A single interpreter instance is
used to run the Octane 2 benchmarks amortizing permutations
associated with REGISTERGLOBAL.
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Fig. 10: WolfSSL performance overheads with SPAM for heap
memory protection.
WolfSSL. We evaluate the WolfSSL [85] (version 4.4.0), as
it is a popular cryptographic library. We use the default build
configuration and the included wolfCrypt Benchmarks with
default parameters which measure symmetric algorithms, such
as AES and ChaCha20 and asymmetric algorithms, such as
RSA and ECC in terms of throughput. The results in Figure 10
are normalized against a baseline execution and show an
overhead with a geometric mean of 2.48x. Enabling global
memory permutation increases the average overheads by an
additional 16%.
C. Buf2Ptr Analysis
Coverage. We show the coverage of our current Buf2Ptr
implementation in Figure 11. Coverage is reported in terms
of the total number of fields in an application with each
9Not all benchmarks are supported by Duktape.
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Fig. 11: Percentage of total struct fields covered by the Buf2Ptr
transformation.
field belonging to one of three categories: (1) Non-promotable,
means that Buf2Ptr is unnecessary as there are no array fields
in an object (2) Promotable, means an array field which can
be safely promoted and (3) Incompatible, means an array
field that is currently considered unsafe to promote. The data
shows that the majority of fields are considered to be non-
promotable (88% on average). Defining structures with internal
array fields is fairly uncommon among the benchmarks we
sample (12% on average). As a result, the total number of
promoted fields is quite low.
The fields that are considered to be incompatible can be
grouped into two categories: (1) those that are fundamentally
troublesome to the Buf2Ptr approach (see Listing 4 for detailed
examples) and (2) artifacts of our current implementation. The
ones that result from our current implementation artificially
inflate our results for incompatible fields. The most note-
worthy is the limited support for promoting fields wrapped
in macros. As it stands, the current Clang rewriter API has
limited support for macro rewriting. An alternative to this
current limitation is to expand macros before processing in
the frontend, but this comes with its own drawbacks making
it difficult to preserve the syntactic structure of the program.
For our current implementation, we have chosen to forgo
this route in favor of preserving the definition and use of
macros and other formatting in the source code. This choice
primarily affects the imagick and x264 benchmarks which
use a CHECKED_MALLOC macro for all structs. In addition
to macros, our current implementation has limited support for
embedded struct declarations, variable length arrays and sin-
gle statement variable declarations. These are straightforward
extensions and are left for future work.
Discussion. The (SPAM + Buf2Ptr) column in Figure 7 shows
the additional performance overheads of applying Buf2Ptr
compared to SPAM alone. We notice that the performance
overheads in Buf2Ptr are mainly due to (1) the one extra
pointer access operation per each sub-object array and (2)
the poor locality of sub-object arrays as they are allocated in
different regions. The cost of the extra pointer operation can be
easily amortized if there exist multiple successive accesses to
the same sub-object array with different addresses. In this case,
one possible optimization is to only compute the new base
address of the sub-object once and allow all future accesses
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Fig. 12: SPAM’s multi-threaded scalability for 2, 4, and 8
threads relative to the single threaded program.
to use it. The locality issue highly depends on the application
behavior. If the application tends to access all struct fields one
after the other, locality and processor’s cache hit rate will be
affected. If the application tends to access the same field from
different objects, locality will not matter.
From a security perspective, the low number of promotable
fields we have observed in the evaluated programs has a
few interesting implications. First, it suggests that intra-object
overflows may account for a small portion of the attack surface
in user-space programs. However, it does not help us identify
the severity of intra-object overflows vulnerabilities. Second,
with respect to Buf2Ptr, the low number of promotable fields
means that the scope of incompatibilities is limited. Thus,
one option to addressing the Buf2Ptr limitations discussed in
Section IX may be done with minimal developer effort (e.g.,
annotations).
D. Multi-Threaded Applications
State-of-the-art memory safety techniques (e.g., ASAN,
Intel MPX) maintain explicit metadata for pointers and objects.
This can result in false positives/negatives in multi-threaded
programs if the metadata is not atomically updated in the same
transaction as a program’s atomic updates to its associated
pointers or objects. The stateless nature of SPAM makes it well
suited for multi-threaded applications. To verify this hypoth-
esis, we run the CRONO benchmark suite [2], a specialized
multi-threaded suite of graph algorithms. Through successful
instrumentation and execution of benchmark applications, it
is shown that our proposed solution is thread-safe and is
suitable for multicore systems. We perform a sweep of each
benchmark using 2, 4, and 8 threads with each bar showing the
normalized execution relative to the single threaded program.
The baseline bars show how the performance scales for the
default program with the SPAM bars representing the scaling
for the hardened version. The results in Figure 12 show
that the relative performance improvements of multi-threaded
programs are unaffected by our stateless runtime as the bars
for the baseline and SPAM are almost equivalent.
E. Permutation Analysis
Uniformity. As discussed in Section V, the uniformity of
permutations is important to ensure good security as it reduces
the success probability of an attacker. To evaluate the uni-
formity of permutations within our framework we conducted
three experiments: (1) within (intra) allocation regions, (2)
across (inter) regions, and (3) different alias numbers for the
same address. The tests are designed to stress the permutation
scheme. We use allocation regions of multiples of 128B
for our LowFat allocator. For the intra region experiment
(Figure 13(a)), we perform one million allocations of a given
size, in this instance the smallest region (128B). For the inter
region experiment (Figure 13(b)), we perform 100 allocations
for 20 different LowFat regions (i.e., 2000 total allocations).
For the aliasing experiment (Figure 13(c)), we perform 10,000
allocations using the same address (so that only alias number
bits are different). For all experiments, we plot histograms with
10 bins. The values are normalized according to the expected
value of each bin (e.g., the total number of allocations divided
by total number of bins). As the data shows, the results in
Figs. 13(a) and 13(b) are very close to ideal indicating that any
permutation is equally likely of being generated. Figure 13(b)
has slightly higher variability compared to Figure 13(a) simply
due to the smaller number of allocations. Figure 13(c) shows
slight modulo biasing as Fisher-Yates must bound the range
of the values from the PRNG, as discussed in Section III-A.
While it is theoretically possible to remove this bias, it involves
the possibility of indefinitely polling the PRNG. We leave the
exploration of alternative FPE shuffling schemes [34], [58] to
future work.
TABLE IV: Throughput of generating permutations for various
PRNGs tested.
PRNG Cycles
AESRand 504
xorshift64* 870
xorshift128+ 932
rand 4652
Performance. A cornerstone in our framework is the ability
to generate truly random permutations. We tested a handful
of pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) available [50],
[47], [74]. Table IV shows the throughput of generating
permutations for the various PRNGs ultimately leading to our
choice of AESRand [74] as it was the most performant within
our framework. This fact is critical in keeping performance
overheads low as the PRNG lies within the critical path of
our entire approach. AESRand is based on the Intel AES-NI
instruction set extensions and 128-bit SIMD. It is known to
pass two widely used statistical tests for PRNGs, namely Big
Crush [45] and PractRand [19].
F. Summary
Unsurprisingly, our evaluation shows that SPAM suffers
from high performance overheads. This is expected due to the
additional instrumentation instructions added for every load
and store; and most importantly, the software implementation
of the permutation function. Both of these overheads can be
mitigated with simple hardware support. For example, the
getaddr primitive can be combined with a load or store
in a single new instruction reducing code size and enhancing
instruction cache utility. Additionally, the genperm primitive
can be implemented with a hardware permutation network
that reduces the current permutation latency from 504 cycles
to be within 2 cycles [46], [66]. We leave the design space
exploration of SPAM’s hardware support for future work.
Even without hardware support, the cohesive security of SPAM
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Fig. 13: The distribution of generated permutations (a) within the same allocation region (b) across different allocation regions
and (c) for aliases of the same allocation.
provides stronger guarantees than existing solutions at modest
performance overheads (e.g., Nginx).
VIII. DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
SPAM requires a strict separation between application
code and data (permuted domain) and external code and data
(unpermuted domain). Otherwise, the loads and stores in the
external code may inadvertently corrupt application memory
as the external code (unless compiled with SPAM) is not
instrumented to deal with permuted memory. In this section,
we discuss different cases that affect the boundaries and how
we handle them.
Externally Invoked Function Pointers. Instrumented code
may be called externally via a function pointer. It is possible
that the function is called from a non permuted domain.
One example, is the comparison function pointer argument
in qsort. This comparison function is typically defined by
the application and thus will be instrumented. On the other
hand, qsort itself is not instrumented as it belongs to external
libraries. Depending on the logic of the external call that uses
the function pointer we either have the option of choosing to
(1) instrument the external library and all of its dependencies
so that they are part of the permuted domain, or (2) create a
variant of the function being pointed to by the function pointer
and all of its dependencies that recursively unpermute the data
upon load. Of the benchmarks we evaluate in Section VII, we
encountered this scenario with qsort in imagick,nab and
x264 and handle them using option two.
External Calls & Nested Memory. Depending on the API
of the external library used there may be instances in which
pointers to permuted memory may be stored inside nested
structures. SPAM handles these nested cases by relying on
the type information of the function arguments to recursively
unpermute and permute memory as necessary. The main lim-
itation with the recursive approach is with self referencing
structures (i.e., those with cycles). In this case, we support
specifying a recursion limit for a given function. Alternatively,
a suitable SPAM wrapper can be implemented to optimally
handle the recursion depth necessary for a given function.
Externally Allocated Memory. A number of functions in
libc may return dynamically allocated memory, the majority
of these are lumped under the Dynamic Allocation Func-
tions [39] extension (e.g., strdup, getline, etc). While
nothing is required for correctness to use these functions with
SPAM, memory returned by them would be unpermuted. In
order to protect memory in these situations, our prototype
emits a permute primitive for memory returned by these
functions.
IX. LIMITATIONS
In this section, we discuss the limitations of our current
implementation and how we plan to address them in the future.
1 struct Foo *f = malloc(sizeof(struct Foo));
2
3 // Type Erasure
4 void *type_erasure = (void *) f;
5 // Type Confusion
6 struct Bar *type_confusion = (struct Bar *)f;
7
8 // Anonymous Allocation
9 void *anon_alloc = malloc(10);
10 f = anon_alloc;
11 struct Foo *f2 = anon_alloc + sizeof(struct Foo);
12
13 // Struct Return-by-Value
14 struct Foo getCopy(struct Foo f);
Listing 4: Examples of code that cannot be legally transformed
using our current Buf2Ptr prototype.
Buf2Ptr. Listing 4 shows the different types of legality
constraints that apply to Buf2Ptr. For example, type erasure
and type confusion result in the loss of the original type
information due to implicit or explicit casting (e.g., Line 3
& 5). With the aid of alias analysis, it is possible to recover
the original type in order to safely apply the transformation.
A second legality requirement pertains to what we refer
to as anonymous allocations (e.g., Line 8), or allocations
in which the type is unknown. This pattern is common in
applications with custom memory allocation wrappers that
manually manage large memory chunks. In this situation,
Buf2Ptr relies on the developer to provide type information for
a safe promotion. Finally, while passing a structure by value is
supported, returning it by value (e.g., Line 13) is not amiable,
to promotion as it breaks the semantics of our transformation.
We empirically evaluate how often these constraints prevent
us from applying Buf2Ptr transformations and thus providing
intra-object safety in Section VII-C.
Inline Assembly. With the current compiler infrastructure,
SPAM is not able to properly instrument inline assembly code.
However, in the future we anticipate that with the integration
of a binary lifter [53], [87] we would be able to instrument IR
generated from inline assembly.
Variadic Functions. Using functions with variable number
of arguments is fully supported in our current prototype.
That includes invoking variadic functions in instrumented code
(e.g., printf and scanf). The only exception is invoking
functions, which (1) are defined in uninstrumented code and
(2) use va_list as an argument (e.g., vsprintf). Those
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function invocations are not currently supported by our proto-
type. However, va_list usage inside of instrumented code
is fully supported. Support for passing va_list externally is
left for future work.
Additional Language Support. Our prototype currently sup-
ports C programs as evaluated in Section VII. Introducing sup-
port for other programming languages (e.g., C++) is straight-
forward as long as a clear separation between instrumented and
uninstrumented code is established. This avoids unnecessary
unpermute/permute overheads. In the case of C++, one way to
add support would involve compiling the standard C++ library
(e.g., libc++ or libstdc++) with SPAM so that data is
unpermuted only at the system call interface.
X. RELATED WORK
Table V summarizes how SPAM compares to prior work.
For each proposal, we specify its security guarantees, in-
strumentation level, and main limitations. We also highlight
whether the proposal is available on commodity systems, has
a precise failure model, supports multi-threading, and provides
side-channel resiliency or not. Finally, we specify whether
the proposal is used as a pre-deployment testing tool (i.e.,
Sanitizer) or a post-deployment mitigation.
Software-based Memory Safety Techniques. Many solutions
have been proposed in academia and industry to tackle the
memory unsafety problem of low level languages. We divide
them into two categories: software and hardware.
Software only solutions can address a wide range of
memory errors either pre-deployment (i.e., Sanitizers) or
post-deployment (i.e., defenses). For instance, AddressSani-
tizer [65] uses shadow memory to detect out-of-bounds er-
rors and uninitialized reads, respectively. However, they lack
the intra-object protection provided by Buf2Ptr. Additionally,
while ASAN is great at finding memory corruption during
testing, it cannot be used as a mitigation. An attacker who
knows that ASAN is in use can simply move pointers past red
zones. SPAM avoids such limitation by using fine-grained per-
instance memory permutation. However, EffectiveSAN does
not detect use-after-free errors in which the freed object is
reallocated to an object of the same type. This case is handled
by SPAM as every allocations utilizes a random alias address,
regardless of its type. Unlike SPAM, EffectiveSAN stores
metadata separately, making it vulnerable to hardware memory
violations, such as speculative execution and side-channels.
Finally, CUP [9] uses per allocation metadata to provide
spatial (inter) and temporal memory safety. This metadata
is vulnerable to hardware memory corruption attacks and
limits scalability of multi-threaded applications. While CUP
instruments libc, compatibility with unprotected code is
not supported by default as it poses significant performance
overheads.
Software only solutions can also be used as post-
deployment mitigations. For instance, SoftboundCETS [51],
[52] provides intra-object protection with a modest perfor-
mance overhead. Unlike SPAM, SoftboundCETS can not
support multi-threaded applications, which highly limits its
practicality. Another example is DFI [10], which utilizes
points-to analysis to enforce data-flow integrity. While it is
able to provide spatial safety it does not address temporal
vulnerabilities. Moreover, DFI uses explicit metadata which
limits its scalability for multithreaded applications.
Other software-based exploit mitigations, such as Iso-
meron [18] and Shuffler [84] focus on randomizing code lay-
out. Randomizing the code layout serves as an effective means
to make exploits (e.g., ROP, JIT-ROP, etc) more difficult with
minimal performance overheads. However, these approaches
do not directly provide protection against spatial/temporal
memory safety vulnerabilities. Additionally, as they do not
modify data, they provide no resiliency to side-channels. We
categorize SPAM as a post-deployment mitigation that can
reliably thwart attackers who abuse software/hardware memory
vulnerabilities without using explicit metadata or inserting
runtime checks.
Hardware-based Memory Safety Techniques. Hardware-
assisted solutions are promising in terms of low runtime
overheads. Industrial solutions include Intel MPX [54], which
maintains objects bounds in hardware registers, Intel Control-
flow Enforcement Technology (CET) [38], ARM pointer au-
thentication (PAC) [48] and memory tagging (MTE) [3]. Un-
fortunately, MPX introduces compilation complexities leading
to low adoption in practice (GCC and Linux recently dropped
its support [82], [75]). Intel CET only provides backward-edge
protection with a shadow stack and a coarse-grained forward
edge protection with ENDBRANCH instruction. ARM PAC and
ARM MTE compete over the same high order bits of 64-bit
pointers, effectively reducing the entropy of each other. On
the contrary, SPAM’s cohesive approach of permuting memory
removes the need for concatenating incompatible defenses.
Academic proposals, such as CHERI [81], [86] and Cali-
forms [63], come with their own limitations as well. Similar
to SPAM, CHERI only supports a subset of SPEC C programs.
Unlike SPAM, CHERI offers no intra-object protection. Cal-
iforms [63] avoids CHERI’s limitations by randomizing the
layout of structs at compile time, providing probabilistic intra-
object protection. Unlike SPAM, Califorms’ struct randomiza-
tion is exactly the same for all instances of the same struct/class
requiring that the binary remain secret. Moreover, CHERI [86]
and Califorms [63] provide temporal memory safety by using
quarantining (i.e., placing the freed memory chunks in a queue
such that those chunk will not be returned again by malloc
for some period of time). On the contrary, SPAM utilizes
permutations, which allow memory chunks to be available to
new allocations immediately after being freed, avoiding any
additional performance penalty.
Data Randomization. Randomization stands as a last line
of defense when full memory safety cannot be completely
guaranteed. We divide them into two categories; static and
dynamic.
Static techniques either randomize data structure layout at
compile time [49], [71] or randomize the representation of data
in memory via encryption [16], [6], [15]. The above techniques
maintain the same layout for all instances of data structs,
whereas SPAM changes the layout based on data location.
We distinguish SPAM from prior efforts on dynamic data
randomization as follows. First, SALADSPlus [12], [11],
Shapeshifter [80] and POLaR [41] do not randomize all
program data-structures to reduce runtime overheads. The
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TABLE V: Comparison with prior works.
Proposal Commodity Failure Deployment Instrumentation Spatial Protection Temporal Multi-threaded Side-channels Main Limitations
Systems Model * Stage Level Inter Intra Protection Support ¶ Resiliency §
AddressSanitizer [65] 3 Precise Pre Source 3 7‖ 3 Detect subset of intra-object violations
EffectiveSAN [21] 3 Precise Pre Source 3 3 3† Metadata vulnerable to memory disclosure attacks
CUP [9] 3 Precise Pre Source 3 7 3 Metadata vulnerable to memory disclosure attacks
SoftBoundCETS [51], [52] 3 Precise Post Source 3 3 3 No support for multithreading
DFI [10] 3 Precise Post Source 3 3‡ 7 Imprecise points-to analysis
Isomeron [18] 3 Imprecise Post Binary 7 7 7 No data protection
Shuffler [84] 3 Imprecise Post Binary 7 7 7 No data protection
MPX [54], [92] 3 Precise Post Source 3 3 3 Dropped support in GCC/Linux
Intel CET [38] 7 Precise Post Source 7 7 7 No data protection
ARM PAC [57] 3 Precise Post Source 3 7 3 Pointers-only protection
ARM MTE [3] 7 Precise Post Source 3 7 7 Limited entropy (8-bits)
CHERI [81], [86] 7 Precise Post Source 3 7 3 No support for intra-object protection
Califorms [63] 7 Precise Post Source 3 3 3 No runtime randomization
PointGuard [16] 3 Imprecise Post Source 3 7 7 Pointers-only protection. Weak encryption (XOR)
Data Randomization [15], [6] 3 Imprecise Post Source 3 7 7 Same layout for all instances. Weak encryption (XOR)
SALADSPlus [12], [11] 3 Precise Post Source 3 3 7 Partial objects randomization
Shapeshifter [80] 3 Precise Post Source 3 3 7 Metadata vulnerable to memory disclosure attacks
POLaR [41] 3 Imprecise Post Source 3 3 7 Partial objects randomization
Smokestack [1] 3 Imprecise Post Source 3 7 7 Stack-only protection
RA-malloc [40] 3 Imprecise Post Binary 3 7 7 Low randomization entropy (3-bits)
SPAM 3 Imprecise Post Source 3 3 3 Incomplete type information in Buf2Ptr
* Solutions with imprecise failure models are suitable for post-deployment. Those with precise failure models are suitable for pre-deployment (i.e., testing).
¶ - Supported (stateless); - Supported (requires synchronization on global metadata); - No support.
§ - Resilient to RowHammer, hardware side-channels, ColdBoot; - Resilient to some; - None.
‖ Experimental support via -fsanitize-address-field-padding
† Does not detect errors where the free’d object is reallocated to an object of the same type.
‡ Depends on points-to analysis.
protected subset is either manually chosen [12], [11], [80], or
based on data-flow analysis [41]. Second, the above solutions
offer no protection for their runtime metadata. Unlike SPAM’s
strong threat model, POLaR [41] assumes that the attacker
has no read/write capabilities before bypassing the defense
itself. Third, while Smokestack [1] relies on secure PRNG to
pick runtime permutations similar to SPAM, it generates the
permutations offline and stores them in lookup table at program
memory. The limited size of such table reduces Smokestack
entropy compared to SPAM. Additionally, Smokestack’s ap-
proach is highly tuned for stack protection and may not scale
against heap vulnerabilities in its current state. Finally, RA-
malloc [40] permutes heap allocations by randomizing the byte
location of the starting address of pointers. As pointers are
of 8-byte size, RA-malloc offers
( 1
8
)
success probability for
the attacker compared to
( 1
16!
)
for SPAM.
Secure Allocators. Secure memory alloctors provide prob-
abilistic guarantees for spatial memory protection, temporal
one (e.g., FreeSentry [88] and Oscar [17]), or both (e.g.,
DieHard [5], FreeGuard [67], and GUARDER [68]). Although
those solutions typically come with minimal performance
overheads, they lack protection against intra-object memory
violations. Additionally, they only randomize the starting lo-
cation of the newly allocated object; making them vulnerable
to hardware memory corruption attacks unlike SPAM that
permutes the object-data itself.
XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented SPAM, a software defense that
significantly improves the resilience of applications to software
and hardware memory violations. SPAM’s novel insight of
permuting data based on its memory location permits per-
instance dynamic permutation. Our proposed Buf2Ptr trans-
formation allows SPAM to guarantee sub-object protection
against data corruption attacks. We built an initial prototype
to demonstrate SPAM using an LLVM compiler pass with an
extension to to the compiler-rt runtime. We successfully
compiled and ran a variety of applications with SPAM to show
its deployability. SPAM + Buf2Ptr provides comprehensive
security guarantees and has modest overheads for I/O bound
workloads (e.g., 1.4x for Nginx). Moreover, SPAM efficiently
scales with multi-threaded applications. Our security evalua-
tion shows that SPAM provides strong probabilistic protection
(where an attacker chance of success is as low as 116! ≈ 10−14)
against a wide range of memory corruption attacks that have
not been previously covered by a single mitigation.
Our experience developing SPAM shows that further opti-
mizations would allow the security benefits of data permutation
to extend to other parts of a system: (1) a SPAM instru-
mented OS can significantly harden the root of trust (2) a
specialized SPAM allocator would allow us to provide fine-
grained memory safety to 32-bit systems without high runtime
overheads (3) while we currently support C programs, with
more engineering effort we can support C++ programs as well
and (4) minimal hardware extensions can significantly reduce
the overhead making SPAM applicable for a wide variety of
workloads. We believe that cohesive solutions like SPAM are
mandatory to stand against the daily influx of attacks.
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APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL EVALUATION
This appendix provides more information about our
evaluation configurations and additional performance results
for SPAM.
A. Configuration
Compiler Flags. Table VI shows a full list of compiler flags
and environment variables used in Section VII.
TABLE VI: Compiler Setup
Tool Compiler Compile Flags Runtime Flags
ASAN Clang 9
-fsanitize=address
-asan-stack=0
-asan-globals=0
-fsanitize-recover=address
-O3
-flto=thin
print_legend=false
print_full_thread_history=false
halt_on_error=false
detect_leaks=0
MPX GCC 7.3.1
-fcheck-pointer-bounds
-fchkp-narrow-bounds
-fchkp-use-wrappers
-O2
CHKP_VERBOSE=0
CHKP_PRINT_SUMMARY=0
SPAM
(This paper)
Clang 4.0.0
--size-128
--func-scope-opt
--cache
-O3
-flto=thin
Nginx. In Listing 5, we show the configuration file used
for both the baseline and SPAM enabled Nginx instances
used during evaluation. Here benchmark_html is a
directory that contains the files of different sizes that
are served. The different sized files are generated using
python -c "print('X'*${FS})" > ${FS}.html
where ${FS} is the file size. Additionally, we disable
non-essential features as shown in Listing 6 to narrow the
scope of testing to just file serving.
B. Additional Results
Olden. We further evaluate SPAM on a pointer and allocation
intensive benchmark suite, Olden [60]. We use the big test
input as specified by llvm-test-suite. Figure 14 shows
the geometric mean of each tool: ASAN (2.02x), MPX (3.65x),
SPAM (3.25x) and SPAM + Buf2Ptr (3.31x). An interesting
outlier for MPX is em3d whose singly-linked list data structure
stresses the bounds checking mechanism.
PtrDist. We evaluate SPAM performance compared to
ASAN and Intel MPX using the Pointer-Intensive Benchmark
Suite [4], or PtrDist, which is a collection of applications
specifically designed to test pointer-intensive operations. Fig-
ure 15 shows the evaluation results using the input set, as
specified by the llvm-test-suite.
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Fig. 14: Olden performance for different tools normalized to their corresponding baseline for heap memory protection.
1 worker_processes 1;
2
3 error_log logs/error.log debug;
4
5 events {
6 worker_connections 1024;
7 }
8
9 http {
10 include mime.types;
11 default_type application/octet-stream;
12 root benchmark_html;
13 sendfile on;
14 tcp_nopush on;
15 keepalive_timeout 65;
16
17 server {
18 listen 8776;
19 server_name localhost;
20
21 location / {
22 index index.html;
23 }
24
25 error_page 500 502 503 504 /50x.html;
26 location = /50x.html {
27 root docs/html;
28 }
29 }
30 }
Listing 5: The Nginx web server configuration used in our
performance evaluation.
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Fig. 15: PtrDist Performance.
C. SPAM Overheads Breakdown
Figure 16 shows the performance overheads for SPAM’s
instrumentation and memory allocator without permuting pro-
gram data for SPEC2017. The overheads are relative to the
uninstrumented baseline using the default system malloc.
Instrumentation (which includes the allocator overhead) on
average accounts for 58%. There is further room for improve-
1 user:˜$ auto/configure \
2 --without-pcre \
3 --without-http_rewrite_module \
4 --without-http-cache \
5 --without-http_gzip_module \
6 --without-http_proxy_module \
7 --without-http_limit_conn_module \
8 --without-http_limit_req_module \
9 --without-http_browser_module \
10 --without-http_charset_module \
11 --without-http_ssi_module \
12 --without-http_userid_module \
13 --without-http_access_module \
14 --without-http_auth_basic_module \
15 --without-http_geo_module \
16 --without-http_map_module \
17 --without-http_split_clients_module \
18 --without-http_referer_module \
19 --without-http_rewrite_module \
20 --without-http_fastcgi_module \
21 --without-http_uwsgi_module \
22 --without-http_scgi_module \
23 --without-http_memcached_module \
24 --without-http_empty_gif_module \
25 --without-http_upstream_hash_module \
26 --without-http_upstream_ip_hash_module \
27 --without-http_upstream_least_conn_module \
28 --without-http_upstream_keepalive_module \
29 --without-http_upstream_zone_module
Listing 6: The Nginx build configuration parameters.
0
1
2
3
N
o
rm
. E
xe
c.
Instrumentation Allocator
Fig. 16: SPAM overhead for SPEC2017.
ment by using more accurate alias analysis, and writing tighter
code for optimized case specific functions allowing for more
inlining opportunities. As we can see, padding allocations to be
multiples of 128 bytes adds an average allocator overhead of
20% for SPEC. While this allows permutations to be computed
more efficiently, it is worth noting that there may be room for
future performance gains by aligning to a smaller size.
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APPENDIX B
LIBRARY WRAPPERS
To avoid paying the performance penalty of unpermuting
and permuting memory when making external library calls, we
implement SPAM optimized wrappers for memory intensive
functions. This allows us to directly operate on permuted
memory. The most important of these functions are primarily
found in the C standard library’s string.h section (e.g.,
memcpy, memmove, memset, strcpy, etc). Table VII lists
the libc wrappers we implemented to support the programs
used in Section VII.
TABLE VII: SPAM Wrapper List
• memcpy • memmove
• memset • memcmp
• memchr • strtok
• strcmp • strncmp
• strcasecmp • strncasecmp
• strlen • strnlen
• strcat • strncat
• strspn • strcspn
• strcpy • strncpy
• strchr • strstr
• strpbrk • setvbuf
• setbuf • setlinebuf
• setbuffer • putenv
• getline • getdelim
• realpath • getcwd
• bcopy • read
• write • fopen
• fdopen • freopen
• fread • fwrite
• fclose • opendir
• fdopendir • closedir
• tmpfile • writev
• epoll_ctl • epoll_wait
APPENDIX C
SYSTEM-LEVEL APPLICABILITY
While our current implementation explores SPAM’s ap-
plicability within the application domain, we expand on how
SPAM integrates in the context of an entire system.
OS Interface. Only user-land applications are currently sup-
ported by our prototype. As a result, data needs to be unper-
muted before making any system-call (e.g., write). Similarly,
we permute the data directly after system calls that write to
program memory (e.g., read). The above data serialization
adds additional runtime overheads and allows an attacker with
access to an OS vulnerability to corrupt the data while it is
unpermuted. One possible solution is to instrument OS APIs
with SPAM so that no serialization is needed. We leave this
for future work.
Non 64-bit Architectures. Non 64-bit systems (e.g., 32-bit
processors) are widely used in Internet-of-Things and Cyber
Physical Systems, not to mention a large body of legacy
systems. Thus, it is important to consider the applicability of
SPAM to this class of devices. While our current implementa-
tion is not suited for these systems due to our choice of LowFat
allocator and use-after-free protection, this does not preclude
SPAM from supporting 32-bit architectures. To do so, we
propose leveraging the flexibility to use a traditional allocator
(e.g., dlmalloc) while ensuring that no two C structs are of
the same size. The latter condition is to guarantee use-after-free
protection in the absence of the alias bits. As SPAM permutes
structs based on base address and size, having unique struct
sizes guarantees unique permutations even if the base address
is the same.
APPENDIX D
SPAM RUNTIME APIS
We list the C API for the functionality described in
Section IV.
void *GetBasePtr(void *Ptr) (1)
Get Allocation Base Address. SPAM needs a way to retrieve
the base address of an allocation from an arbitrary pointer
in order to then compute the correct permutation. How this
metadata is retrieved varies depending on the underlying
allocator used to implement SPAM. Our current prototype
relies on the LowFat allocator [20] which is able to retrieve
this information implicitly in constant time by partitioning the
memory space into aligned fixed sized regions. It is important
to note that broader SPAM technique is not bound to a specific
allocator.
uint64_t GetSize(void *BaseAddr) (2)
Get Allocation Size. In addition to the base address above,
the runtime also needs a mechanism to determine the bounds,
or size, of an allocation. Given the base address the underlying
allocator must be able to return this information. In our current
implementation using LowFat, this information is implicitly
derived from the base address itself.
uint64_t GenPerm(uint64_t K, void *BA, size_t S) (3)
void *GetPermPtr(void *Ptr, uint64_t Perm) (4)
void *Unpermute(void *Ptr)
void *Permute(void *Ptr)
(5)
void RegisterGlobal(void *Ptr) (6)
void *RegisterStack(void *Ptr) (7)
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